

COVERT ACTION INFORMATION BULLETIN

PREMIER ISSUE

JULY 1978


FREE

CONTENTS

WHO WE ARE	3
WHERE MYTHS LEAD TO MURDER, BY PHILIP AGEE	4
THROWING A CASE: THE TRIAL OF ARMANDO LOPEZ ESTRADA	8
“RESEARCHING CONSUMERS”: THE MARKET FOR DESTABILIZATION	15
RECENT NEWS	22
NAMING NAMES	23
PUBLICATIONS OF INTEREST	24

DIRTY WORK

The CIA In Western Europe



**Edited by Philip Agee and
Louis Wolf**

For the past several years, beginning in 1974, new "enemies" have haunted the Central Intelligence Agency — journalists and ex-agents. These people are bent on exposing the CIA's unscrupulous tactics so the American public can see what the CIA has spawned and what is being done under the deceptive cover of "national security."

John Marks, Victor Marchetti, Morton H. Halperin and especially Philip Agee have shown considerable courage in informing the world about the seamy side of American espionage. They have opened much of the secret portfolio, ranging from the routine planting of phony news stories to assassination attempts and the overthrow of legitimate governments.

In this startling book a comprehensive picture of the CIA emerges. More important, the authors explain the simple way in which any competent researcher can recognize the people behind the dirty work — thus breaking the "cover" of thousands of CIA agents around the world.

Dirty Work is a major exposé of the CIA — what it does and who does it — on a scale never before revealed.

PHILIP AGEE, an ex-CIA operative, is the Agency's number one nemesis and author of the best-selling *Inside The Company: CIA Diary*. LOUIS WOLF is a journalist who has done intensive research into the American intelligence community.

LYLE STUART

\$24.95

0-8184-0268-7

SPECIAL OFFER

This startling and invaluable new exposé of the CIA, just published, lists for \$24.95. If you order your copy through the *CovertAction Information Bulletin*, and at the same time subscribe to the *Bulletin*, we will give you a \$10.00 discount from the cost of your subscription. Just send the enclosed order form in along with your subscription blank.

DIRTY WORK: Order Form

— — — — —
Please send me a copy of *Dirty Work*. My check or money order for \$24.95 (U.S. funds, please), is enclosed.

Name: _____

Mailing Address: _____

WHO WE ARE

One and a half years ago the last issue of *CounterSpy Magazine* appeared. Although the scope of coverage, the depth of research, and the impact of *CounterSpy* around the world were on the rise, personal and political disputes coupled with CIA harassment led to an impasse among the staff. Those of us who had been working most closely with Phil Agee left the magazine to continue research, and others stayed on, ostensibly to continue the magazine. They were not successful.

We have felt, since the beginning, that there is an important and vital role to be played by the sort of exposés for which *CounterSpy* had become world-famous. We decided that the dissemination of such information must resume. That *CounterSpy* and its uncovering of CIA personnel and operations around the world were so violently hated by the Agency was our best endorsement. The compliments and encouragement we received from progressive people everywhere convinced us that we could not leave this void in the mosaic of struggles against the U.S. intelligence complex.

We begin modestly with a small Bulletin which we intend to publish approximately bi-monthly. This first issue is being distributed at no charge. We are confident that there will be sufficient subscribers to make this publication a permanent weapon in the fight against the CIA, the FBI, military intelligence, and all the other instruments of U.S. imperialist oppression throughout the world. We know that the information and the research is there, crying out to be published and disseminated.

We encourage everyone to keep in touch with us, to correspond, to submit leads, tips, suggestions and articles. We will try to track down all your leads. Most especially, we will never stop exposing CIA personnel and operations whenever and wherever we find them. We are particularly anxious to receive, anonymously if you desire, copies of U.S. diplomatic lists and U.S. embassy staff and/or telephone directories, from any countries.

A major step in that battle has already been taken. Two of our group, Phil Agee and Lou Wolf, have edited and prepared a new book, *Dirty Work*, just published by Lyle Stuart, Inc. This book describes in detail how to expose CIA personnel, includes dozens of articles from many countries which have done just that, and presents, in Appendix form, detailed biographies of more than 700 undercover CIA and NSA personnel lurking in embassies and military installations in virtually every country on earth. We urge all our readers to study this book, and the simple methodology it sets forth. And, of course, to let us know the results of your own research.

The book, which is at present only in hardcover, is unfortunately expensive. While we recognize that the years of research which went into it, and the expensive, complicated and lengthy printing which it involved, justify such a cover

price, we have arranged for a special offer for our readers. If you order a copy of the book through us—see the ad on page 2—we will give a \$10 rebate on all charter one-year subscriptions to the *CovertAction Information Bulletin*. If you are in the United States, this is the full price; if you are overseas, you will only have to pay the postage.



One of our group was a CIA case officer for twelve years; two others worked in finance and support for the CIA for nine years; the rest of us have devoted much of the past several years to direct research on U.S. intelligence operations. We hope that we can put this experience to valuable use through the pages of the *CovertAction Information Bulletin*. We hope you will agree, and will support us.

Phil Agee
Ellen Ray
Bill Schaap
Elsie Wilcott
Jim Wilcott
Lou Wolf

WHERE MYTHS LEAD TO MURDER

by Philip Agee

Copyright © 1978 by C.I. Publications, Inc.

[This article is a slightly modified version of the introduction to the book *Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe*, by Philip Agee and Louis Wolf, just published. It expresses much of the philosophy of the *CovertAction Information Bulletin*.]

Today the whole world knows, as never before, how the U.S. government and U.S. corporations have been secretly intervening in country after country to corrupt politicians and to promote political repression. The avalanche of revelations in the mid-1970s, especially those concerning the CIA, shows a policy of secret intervention that is highly refined and consistently applied.

Former President Ford and leading government spokesmen countered by stressing constantly the need for the CIA to retain, and to use when necessary, the capability for executing the kinds of operations that brought to power the military regime in Chile. Ford even said in public that he believed events in Chile had been "in the best interests of the Chilean people." And even with President Carter's human rights campaign there has been no indication that the CIA has reduced or stopped its support of repressive dictatorships in Iran, Indonesia, South Korea, Brazil, and other bastions of "the free world."

The revelations, though, have not only exposed the operations of the CIA, but also the individual identities—the names, addresses, and secret histories—of many of the people who actually do the CIA's work. Yet, with all the newly available information, many people still seem to believe the myths used to justify this secret political police force. Some of the myths are, of course, actively spread by my former CIA colleagues; others come from their liberal critics. But whatever the source, until we lay the myths to rest, they will continue to confuse people and permit the CIA—literally—to get away with murder.


Myth Number One: The CIA is primarily engaged in gathering intelligence information against the Soviet Union.

This is perhaps the CIA's longest-playing myth, going back to the creation of the Agency in 1947 and the choice of the name "Central Intelligence Agency." As the Agency's

backers explained the idea to the American Congress, afraid even in those early days of getting dragged into unwanted foreign adventures, the CIA was needed to find out what a possible enemy was planning in order to protect the United States from a surprise attack. Americans at the time still shared a vivid memory of the unexpected Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, and with the likelihood that the new enemy—the Soviet Union—would soon have atomic bombs, no one could really doubt the need to know if and when an attack might come.

The real success in watching the Soviets, however, came from technological breakthroughs like the U-2 spy plane and spy-in-the-sky satellites, and the job of strategic intelligence fell increasingly to the technically sophisticated U.S. National Security Agency. The CIA played a part, of course, and it also provided centralized processing of information and data storage. But in its operations the CIA tended to put its emphasis on covert action—financing friendly politicians, murdering suspected foes, and staging *coups d'état*.

This deeply involved the Agency in the internal politics of countries throughout Western Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, as well as in the Soviet bloc. And even where CIA officers and agents did act as



spies, gathering intelligence information, they consistently used that information to further their programs of action.

The CIA's operatives will argue that the ultimate goal of discovering Soviet and other governments' intentions requires live spies at work in places like the Kremlin—that the Agency exists to recruit these spies and to keep them alive

and working. A Penkovsky or two should be on the payroll at all times to keep America safe from Russian adventures. This argument may influence some people, because theoretically, spy satellites and other forms of monitoring only give a few minutes' warning, whereas a person in the right place can report on decisions as soon as they are made, giving perhaps days or weeks of warning. Such a spy might also be of great value for the normal conduct of relations—whether in negotiations, cooperation, or confrontation.

Nevertheless, the vast CIA effort to recruit officials of importance in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Defense Ministry, KGB, and GRU has never had significant success. There have indeed been defections, but these, I was told in the CIA, had nothing to do with the elaborate traps and snares laid out by the CIA around the world. They resulted from varying motivations and psychological pressures operating on the official who defected. In this respect, the CIA's strengthening of repressive foreign security services, necessary for laying out the snares (telephone tapping, travel control, observation posts, surveillance teams, etc.), can scarcely be justified by the nil recruitment record.

Today, notwithstanding recent "reforms," the CIA remains primarily an action agency—doing and not just snooping. Theirs is the grey area of interventionist action between striped-pants diplomacy and invasion by the Marines, and their targets in most countries remain largely the same: governments, political parties, the military, police, secret services, trade unions, youth and student organizations, cultural and professional societies, and the public information media. In each of these, the CIA continues to prop up its friends and beat down its enemies, while its goal remains the furthering of U.S. hegemony so that American multinational companies can intensify their exploitation of the natural resources and labor of foreign lands.

Of course this has little to do with strategic intelligence or preventing another Pearl Harbor, while it has a lot to do with the power of certain privileged groups within the United States and their friends abroad. The CIA spreads the myth of "intelligence gathering" in order to obscure the meaning of what the Agency is really doing.

Myth Number Two: The major problem is lack of control, that is, the CIA is a "rogue elephant."

This myth comes not from the CIA, but from its liberal critics, many of whom seem to believe that all would be well if only Congress or the President would exercise tighter control. Yet, for all the recent horror stories, one finds little evidence that a majority in Congress want the responsibility for control, while the executive branch continues to insist—rightly—that the Agency's covert action operations have, with very few exceptions, followed the orders of successive presidents and their National Security Councils. As former Secretary of State Kissinger told Representative Otis Pike's Intelligence Investigating Committee, "Every operation is personally approved by the President."

For its part the Pike committee concluded in its official report, first published in "leaked" form by the *Village Voice*, that "all evidence in hand suggests that the CIA, far from being out of control has been utterly responsive to the instructions of the President and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs."

So the problem is said to be with the presidents—Democratic and Republican—who, over the past 30 years,

have given the green light to so many covert operations. But why were the operations necessary? And why secret? The operations had to be secret, whether they involved political bribes, funding of anticommunist journals, or fielding of small armies, because in every case they implied either government control of supposedly non-governmental institutions or violation of treaties and other agreements. In other words, hypocrisy and corruption. If the government was going to subvert free, democratic, and liberal institutions, it would have to do so secretly.



There is, however, a more basic reason for the secrecy—and for the CIA. Successive administrations—together with American-based multinational corporations—have continually demanded the freest possible access to foreign markets, labor, agricultural products, and raw materials. To give muscle to this demand for the "open door," recent presidents have taken increasingly to using the CIA to strengthen those foreign groups who cooperate—and to destroy those who do not. This has been especially clear in countries such as Chile under Allende, or Iran 20 years earlier under Mossadegh, where strong nationalist movements insisted on some form of socialism to ensure national control of economic resources.

The CIA's covert action operations abroad are not *sui generis*. They happen because they respond to internal U.S. requirements. We cannot wish them away through fantasies of some enlightened President or Congress who would end American subversion of foreign peoples and institutions by the wave of a wand. Not surprisingly, the U.S. Senate rejected by a very wide margin a legislative initiative that would have prohibited covert action programs by the CIA.

Only prior radical change within the U.S., change that will eliminate the process of accumulating the value of foreign labor and resources, will finally allow an end to secret intervention abroad. Until then, we should expect more intervention by the CIA and multinational corporations—not less. Increasingly important will be the repressive capabilities of the Agency's "sister" services abroad.

Myth Number Three: Weakening the CIA opens wider the door for Soviet expansion and eventual world domination.

This myth is peddled especially hard at times when liberation movements make serious gains. Former President Ford and Dr. Kissinger used it frequently during the CIA's ill-fated intervention in Angola, and we continue to hear it again as liberation movements seek Soviet and Cuban help in their struggles against the apartheid policies of the white Rhodesians and South Africans.

The problem for America, however, is not "Soviet expansionism," despite all the anticomunism with which we are indoctrinated practically from the cradle. The problem, rather, is that the American government, preeminently the CIA, continues to intervene on the side of "friends" whose property and privilege rest on the remnants of archaic social systems long since discredited. The political repression required to preserve the old order depends on American and other Western support which quite naturally is turning more and more people against the United States—more effectively, for sure, than anything the KGB could ever concoct.

As Senator Frank Church explained in an interview on British television, "I'm apt to think that the Russians are going to choose [sides] better than we will choose nine times out of ten. After all we're two hundred years away from our revolution; we're a very conservative country."

Myth Number Four: Those who attack the CIA, especially those who have worked in the intelligence community, are traitors, turncoats, or agents of the KGB.

This has been the Agency's chief attack on me personally, and I'm certain that the fear of being tarred with the same brush is keeping many CIA veterans from voicing their own opposition. But as with earlier efforts to find the "foreign hand" in the American antiwar movement, the CIA has failed to produce a shred of evidence that any of its major American (or European) critics are in the service of any foreign power.

Would-be "reformers" of the CIA have also discovered how the Agency reacts to criticism. According to Representative Pike, the CIA's Special Counsel threatened to destroy Pike's political career. In a conversation with Pike's chief investigative staff person, the Special Counsel was quoted thus: "Pike will pay for this [directing the vote to approve the committee report on the CIA]—you wait and see. I'm serious. There will be political retaliation. Any political ambitions in New York that Pike had are through. We will destroy him for this."

CIA veterans must not be intimidated by the Agency's false and unattributed slander. We have a special responsibility for weakening this organization. If put at the service of those we once oppressed, our knowledge of how the CIA really works could keep the CIA from ever really working again. And though the CIA will brand us as "traitors," people all over the world, including the United States, will respond, as they have already, with enthusiastic and effective support.

Myth Number Five: Naming individual CIA officers does little to change the Agency, and is done only to expose innocent individuals to the threat of assassination.

Nothing in the anti-CIA effort has stirred up more anger than the publishing of the names and addresses of CIA

officials in foreign countries, especially since the killing of the CIA Station Chief in Athens, Richard Welch. CIA



spokesmen—and journals such as the *Washington Post*—were quick to accuse me and *CounterSpy* magazine of having "fingered" Welch for the "hit," charging that in publishing his name, we were issuing "an open invitation to kill him." The Agency also managed to exploit Welch's death to discredit and weaken those liberals in Congress who wanted only to curtail some of the Agency's more obvious abuses. Subsequent research, noted in *Dirty Work*, makes abundantly clear that *CounterSpy* had nothing to do with the Welch killing.

The result of the Agency's manipulations isn't hard to predict. The CIA, for all its sins, came out of the recent investigations *strengthened* by the Ford "reforms," while the Congress may attempt to pass an official secrets act that will attempt to make it a crime for any present or former government official ever again to blow the whistle by making public classified information. No more *Pentagon Papers*. No more Watergate revelations. No more *CIA Diaries*.

Nonetheless, the naming goes on. More and more CIA people can now be held personally accountable for what they and the Agency as an institution do—for the real harm they cause to real people. Their military coups, torture chambers, and terrorism cause untold pain, and their backing of multinational corporations and local elites helps push

millions to the edge of starvation, and often beyond. They are the Gestapo and SS of our time, and as in the Nuremberg Trials and the war in Vietnam, they cannot shed their individual responsibility simply because they were following a superior's orders.

But apart from the question of personal responsibility, the CIA remains a secret political police, and the exposure of its secret operations—and secret operatives—remains the most effective way to reduce the suffering they cause. Already a handful of journalists and former intelligence officers have managed to reveal the names and addresses of hundreds of CIA people, and even the *Washington Post*—which condemns us for doing it—has admitted that our efforts added greatly to the CIA's growing demoralization. We also noticed from our own investigations that the Agency was forced to step up its security precautions and to transfer many of those named to other posts. All of this disrupts and destabilizes the CIA, and makes it harder for them to inflict harm on others.

Of course, some people will always raise the cry that we are "trying to get someone killed." But, as it happens, violence is not really needed. By removing the mask of anonymity from CIA officers, we make it difficult for them to remain at overseas posts. We hope that the CIA will have the good sense to shift these people to the increasingly smaller number of safe posts, preferably to a desk inside the CIA headquarters at Langley, Virginia. In this way the CIA will protect the operatives named—and also the lives of their potential victims.

From the old song and dance of the "intelligence gathering" to the claim that "those who expose are the murderers," these five myths won't simply vanish. The CIA—and its allies—will continue to propagate them, and the CIA's critics will have to respond. We must increasingly expose these myths and the crimes they cover up.

But besides debating, there is much more that we can do—especially in furthering the exposure of the Agency and its secret operatives. The CIA probably has no more than 5,000 officers experienced in running clandestine operations and it should be possible to identify almost all of those who have worked under diplomatic cover at any time in their careers. *Dirty Work* lists mainly those named as CIA operatives in Europe; we hope additional volumes can be published on the CIA's people in other areas. All that is required is a continuing effort—and a novel form of international cooperation. Here's how:

1. In each country a team of interested people, including journalists, should obtain a list of all the Americans working in the official U.S. Mission: the Embassy, consulates, AID offices, and other U.S. installations. This list can be acquired through a friend in the host Foreign Ministry, in the American Embassy—or by other means.
2. The team should then get past editions of necessary public documents—U.S. *Foreign Service Lists* and *Biographic Registers* (both published by the Department of State) from a local library, and the *Diplomatic List* and *Consular List* published regularly by every Foreign Ministry. The *Diplomatic* and *Consular Lists* will contain the names and addresses of the higher ranking members of the official mission, including some of the CIA people.

3. Check the names as suggested in the various articles in *Dirty Work*, especially John Marks' "How to Spot a Spook." Watch carefully for persons carried on the Foreign Ministry's *Diplomatic* and *Consular Lists*, but who are missing from the recent *Biographic Registers* and *Foreign Service Lists*. Most of these will be CIA people purposely left off the State Department lists.

4. After narrowing down the list of likely suspects, check them with us and with other similarly oriented groups. *CovertAction Information* will follow up on all leads, and publish all the information it can confirm.

5. Once the list is fully checked, publish it. Then organize public demonstrations against those named—both at the American Embassy and at their homes—and, where possible, bring pressure on the government to throw them out. Peaceful protest will do the job. And when it doesn't, those whom the CIA has most oppressed will find other ways of fighting back.

Naturally, as new CIA people replace the old, it will be necessary to repeat the process, perhaps every few months. And as the campaign spreads, and the CIA learns to correct the earlier and more obvious flaws in its use of State Department cover, we will have to develop new ways to spot them. Already the Agency has gotten the State Department to restrict circulation of the all-important *Biographic Register*, and it is likely that the Administration will in future place more of its people under cover of the Department of Defense (for example, in military bases, and in Military Assistance Groups), the Drug Enforcement Agency, and the multinational corporations.

In rare cases, the CIA may even attempt changing the identities of certain operatives. Nonetheless, the CIA will always need a secure base in embassies and consulates to keep its files and communications facilities, and there are many ways to identify the CIA people in these missions without relying on public documents.

Within the United States, people can help this campaign by supporting the groups struggling to stop covert intervention abroad. There is also the need for continuing research into current CIA operations, and new programs to identify and keep track of all the FBI special agents and informers, military intelligence personnel, and the Red Squads and SWAT groups of local and state police departments.

Together, people of many nationalities and varying political beliefs can cooperate to weaken the CIA and its surrogate intelligence services, striking a blow at political repression and economic injustice. The CIA can be defeated. The proof can be seen from Vietnam to Angola, and in all the other countries where liberation movements are rapidly gaining strength.

We can all aid this struggle, together with the struggle for socialism in the United States itself.

THROWING A CASE: THE TRIAL OF ARMANDO LOPEZ ESTRADA

"The testimony will essentially be this. On approximately August 15th of 1977 at approximately 10:00 a.m., Special Agents of the United States Customs Service went to the house of Pedro Gil at 52 Northwest 58th Avenue in Miami, Florida, just a short ways off Flagler Street.

"At that location, which is a house, or a house that is fairly close to the street, a single family dwelling, there was a boat parked on a trailer in the driveway.

"The evidence will show that this is a 23 Formula outboard boat.

"At the time the agents went there they met Mr. Gil and after a brief conversation with Mr. Gil, they boarded his boat and searched it.

"What they found on the boat then becomes the subject of the evidence in this case.

"They found on the boat one 20 mm. cannon, one .50 caliber machinegun, one .30 caliber machinegun, two Browning rifles, five weapons that are commonly known as AR-15 Colt rifles, two of which had been converted to fully automatic.

"Approximately ninety rounds of 20 mm. ammunition and thousands of rounds of additional ammunition to fit these other weapons."¹

Thus begins the prosecutor's opening statement in the trial of four Cuban exiles charged with unlawful possession of unregistered firearms. Never once did any of the four deny that they possessed the weapons, or that they were intended for an armed raid against the Republic of Cuba. Four days later, on January 10, 1978, they were acquitted.

What happened, and why? *CovertAction Information Bulletin* obtained the complete transcript of the trial, never before available, and carefully studied it and the surrounding events. The conclusion is inescapable that the acquittal was foreordained, and that the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Justice were responsible. What is also clear is that the Carter Administration's alleged detente with Cuba, well before the recent Shaba incident and Brzezinski's ravings, was hypocritical at best, and, on some levels, a simple lie.

¹United States v. Pedro Gil, Armando Lopez Estrada, Juan Raimundo Arce and Isidoro Pineiro Castineira, No. 77-481-Cr-JE, United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Official Transcript (hereinafter "Transcript"), January 6, 1978, Part I, pp. 5-6.

The CBS Documentary

The opening scene can be pinpointed. On June 10, 1977, CBS-TV aired a Bill Moyers special: "CBS Reports—The CIA's Secret Army." The show documented the paramilitary roles of certain segments of the Cuban exile community in the United States. It reviewed the preparation and implementation of the CIA-directed invasion at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, the ignominious defeat of the benighted invaders, and the subsequent recruitment by the United States government of the veterans and sympathizers of the fiasco into bands of terrorists hell-bent on attacking Cuba and overthrowing the government led by Fidel Castro.

The TV correspondent of the *Miami Herald* reported this in his review of the show:

"The Kennedy vengeance began, reports Moyers, as soon as the members of the Brigade 2506 captured during the invasion were ransomed months later. Bobby Kennedy gave top priority to the CIA's mustering of a secret army, based in Miami, to start covert sabotage operations against Castro and his regime. It was called 'Operation Mongoose.'

"A CIA agent, Grayston Lynch, was its recruiter. An Army general, Edward Lansdale, was its military director.

"The CIA virtually dropped 'Operation Mongoose' by 1972, but few involved were aware of that Now . . . the onetime CIA soldiers are simply proceeding on their own, conducting their own war."²

The Moyers show had interviews with various members of Brigade 2506, including Armando Lopez Estrada, the "Chief of Military Operations" of the Brigade. It also exposed to U.S. audiences some shocking scenes filmed in a warehouse in Miami which was stacked floor to ceiling with weapons. Two exiles—one of them as it turns out being Lopez Estrada again—were filmed in the warehouse standing proudly in front of the weapons with sacks over their heads to disguise their identities.

It was a difficult time, diplomatically, for such a show to air. The U.S. and Cuban administrations were negotiating the lessening of tensions, cultural exchanges, and the mutual opening of Interest Sections in each other's country. At the same time, right-wing forces within the United States were decrying any improvement in relations, self-interest notwithstanding. Ironically, the same day that the CBS documentary was aired, Senator Howard Baker was

²*Miami Herald*, June 10, 1977.

quoted as saying, "I think this is the worst time in history to be cozying up to Cuba."³

Despite sentiments such as Baker's, it was clear that something had to be done. The Cuban exiles had it, and they were flaunting it: Warehouses full of weapons in downtown Miami. Cuban exiles bragging about armed attacks. Bombings and killings around the world. And Brigade 2506 stage center, and proud of it. But, as we shall see, what was done by the U.S. government was little more than show.

Armando Lopez Estrada, 38, Juan Raimundo Arce, 37, and Isidoro Pineiro Castineira, 38, were also arrested. They were all charged with possession of unregistered firearms and violation of the Neutrality Act. To this day, Pedro Gil has never made any public statement about the case. The others, however, from the day of the arrests, admitted that the weapons were theirs, said they had been given to them by the CIA, and proudly proclaimed that they were for use against Cuba. The *Miami Herald* noted:



Astonishingly, nothing ever happened to the warehouse full of weapons. Presumably it is still there in Miami. CBS was never questioned, never subpoenaed, nor were the cameramen and still photographers from many newspapers, all of whom saw the inside of the warehouse. Had the participants been left-wing activists instead of right-wing terrorists, one can imagine what would have happened.

Because of the public outcry, though, some kind of investigation--surveilling and following leading Brigade 2506 members--was conducted, and as the Assistant United States Attorney explained to the jury some months later, on August 15, 1977, two months after the TV show, the Customs agents searched Pedro Gil's boat. Thus began the trial that, in the final analysis, might just as well never have taken place.

The Arrests

Pedro Gil, 41, was immediately arrested. Shortly thereafter, based on fingerprint identifications and interrogations,

³*Ibid.*

"Lopez Estrada confirmed that the boats and weapons were part of a plan to attack Cuba. He said one boat was to be used to transport the weapons to a fourth 'intermediary boat' somewhere outside the U.S. limits. Lopez Estrada said that he didn't feel that the group was doing anything wrong since the attack was to be launched from outside the United States. 'If I take weapons outside the United States to be used outside of the United States, is that wrong?' he asked."⁴

Following the arrests, Roberto Carballo, President of Brigade 2506, called several meetings to gather support for the defendants in the Cuban exile community and to raise funds for their defense.

Brigade 2506

The Brigade, with perhaps 500 active members, is comprised of veterans of the Bay of Pigs and other sympathizers.

⁴*Ibid.*, August 16, 1977.

They are a powerful force in the Miami area, where well upwards of 100,000 Cuban exiles reside. A Miami city Commissioner is a member, as is the state Democratic Party Chairman. A few years ago, when the Brigade held its "First Congress," Miami Mayor Maurice Ferré and U.S. Representative Claude Pepper were featured speakers. On the day of the arrest, the *Miami Herald* news story pointed out that the Brigade was "well respected" in the community. Ironically, the editorial in the same issue of the *Herald* took a less-laudatory position:

"Until the mid 1960s, overthrowing Fidel Castro seemed to be the official policy of the United States government. Toward that purpose an agency of the government armed and supported a group of exiles in an abortive attempt to invade Cuba. Other efforts were made to depose the Cuban dictator.

"But the policy gradually changed, and in recent months the rate of change appears to have increased. Most Cuban exiles—many of them now citizens of the United States—find the changes in policy hard to accept. Some merely grumble. Others take their cues from the fiery oratory of demagogues who promise to turn back the clock. And a few—a tiny number, really—take the law into their own hands."⁵

They did more than take the law into their own hands, though; they seemed to have ignored it with relative impunity. On June 29, 1976, there was a meeting at the New England Oyster House in Coral Gables, Florida, involving, as a recent *Penthouse Magazine* article put it, two Chileans, two Cuban exiles, and an American.⁶ It now appears that the participants included Hector Duran, Bernardo de Torres and Armando Lopez Estrada, from the Brigade 2506; General Juan Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, the notorious then-head of DINA, the Chilean secret police; and Michael V. Townley, the American who conspired with the fascist, paramilitary *Patria y Libertad* against the regime




of Salvador Allende, became a DINA operative after the coup, and was directly involved in the murder of Orlando Letelier and Ronnie Moffitt in September of that year.

⁵*Ibid.*

⁶Ernest Volkman and John Cummings, "The Assassination of Orlando Letelier," *Penthouse*, July 1978, p. 52, at p. 59.

This meeting, which was apparently conducted under police and FBI surveillance, and which may have included an informant, centered on the murder of Letelier and several sabotage actions. No police action followed this meeting.

What is more, it is public knowledge that Carballo and Lopez Estrada were also present at the secret meeting in July of 1976 in the Dominican Republic which organized the Coordination of United Revolutionary Organizations (CORU), which claimed credit for the heinous bombing of a Cubana Airliner in October 1976.⁷



We will return to the terrorists—no "tiny number" by the way—and to the Chilean connection, presently. But what of the Miami trial? After so many years of openly defiant and illegal behavior, Armando Lopez Estrada and three of his colleagues were charged with possession of unregistered weapons and violation of the Neutrality Act.

The Neutrality Act Charges

On January 4, 1978, the day before the trial proper was to begin, on the motion of the defense attorneys, United States District Judge of the Southern District of Florida Joe Eaton severed the Neutrality Act charges from the case. The Neutrality Act count of the indictment charged the defendants with planning, from the United States, to attack Cuba, "a country with which the United States is at peace." This particular phrase, essential to a Neutrality Act charge, was at the heart not only of the defense motion to sever, but of the entire trial as well. And this is because (as the defense incessantly pointed out to the judge and jury) of Public Law 87-733 passed by the Eighty-Seventh Congress and signed by John F. Kennedy on October 3, 1962. It reads:

"Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

"That the United States is determined to prevent by whatever means may be necessary including the force of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending, by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere.

⁷*Miami Herald*, August 16, 1977.

"To prevent in Cuba the creation of an externally supported military capability endangering the security of the United States, and

"To work with the Organization of American States and with freedom-loving Cubans to support the aspirations of the Cuban people for self-determination."⁸

This Resolution—this Cold War Monroe Doctrine—is still on the books despite three unsuccessful attempts to repeal it. And because, Judge Eaton said, "it calls for the overthrow of Fidel Castro," he withdrew the Neutrality Act charges until the prosecution could prove to him that Cuba was "a country with which the United States is at peace." So far, there has been no disposition of those charges. The case which went before the jury in Miami in January did not include Neutrality Act charges. Nevertheless, the Act and this Resolution were constantly referred to. Although the defendants were merely charged with possession of unregistered weapons, the defense continually implied that the United States was at war with Cuba, and that the defendants were simply well-meaning patriots.

The Trial

And so, Jerome Sanford, Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, commenced his prosecution of the four Cuban exiles for the knowing and unlawful possession of unregistered firearms.

The prosecution's case was simple. Sanford proved that the weapons and ammunition were found on Pedri Gil's boat in front of his house; he proved that they were in working order; and he proved that they were not registered. He also proved that the fingerprints of the other three were all over the weapons and the boat. He even demonstrated that the defendants did not deny that they were their weapons, and, in fact that they intended to use them to attack Cuba.

Edward O'Donnell and his partner Donald Spain represented the defendants. Although they were well-known Miami criminal lawyers, their entry into the case was somewhat unusual, because Spain had been an Assistant State's Attorney who had prosecuted many Cuban exiles in the local courts. But at present he is well-ensconced in the exiles' legal defense teams, and is representing Guillermo Novo Sampol, a key figure in the Letelier-Moffitt assassinations, on a parole violation charge. He is also the lawyer for Alvin Ross Diaz, like Novo one of the New Jersey exile terrorists, charged with possession of explosives, firearms and drugs.

O'Donnell presented the defense's argument in his opening statement. He concentrated on Lopez Estrada. He was trained, he told the jury, by the CIA for the Bay of Pigs invasion. Afterwards, he was brought to the United States to meet Robert F. Kennedy. "Armando Lopez Estrada personally met with Robert F. Kennedy and was asked if he wanted to continue his fight against Cuba, the Castro Communist regime that was in existence in Cuba at that time. His reply was in the affirmative."⁹ Then he even met President John F. Kennedy, in addition to many CIA agents who trained him in the use of various weapons.

⁸Transcript, January 6, 1978, Part II, p. 99; January 9, 1978, Part I, pp. 87-88.

⁹Transcript, January 6, 1978, Part I, p. 95.

With the express approval of Bobby Kennedy, he took part in dozens of invasions and attacks against Cuba. He also spent several years in the early 1960s in the United States Army, while receiving pay from the CIA. All this time, O'Donnell pointed out, he handled many weapons and was never, obviously, told that he had to register them.

Some time later, Lopez Estrada was given a map by a member of the CIA which gave the location of an arms cache on a small island in the Bahamas, not far from Cuba. There he went with some friends, dug up the weapons, and brought them to Miami for cleaning and for an attack against Cuba to be launched from some place outside the United States. Yes, the defense agreed, Lopez Estrada and his friends had these weapons, but they never dreamed they had to register them. They were still proceeding under Bobby Kennedy's personal orders given seventeen years before. And, yes, the defendants were familiar with Public Law 87-733, and that, to them, was the law of the land, regardless of any so-called detente in the late 1970s.

It was only because of the CBS-TV show that these defendants—"scapegoats"—were before the court at all:

"That documentary did not go far towards cementing relationships with Cuba. A good faith effort towards the cementing of those relationships with Cuba had to be shown.

"Armando Lopez Estrada, Mr. Pineiro, Mr. Arce and Mr. Gil, the evidence will show you, are that good faith effort to show Fidel Castro we mean business.

"The arrests were applauded from the front pages of the *Miami Herald* by Fidel Castro.

"He, in his own words, said this is a step in the right direction towards cementing relationships between the United States and Cuba. That is why we are here."¹⁰

Unfortunately, Fidel Castro had no idea how little good faith there was. As a knowledgeable Miami reporter put it to *CovertAction*, "The prosecutor was ordered to bring the charges, but he sure wasn't ordered to get a conviction."

The Peculiarities of the Trial

There are a number of instances in the trial which do not ring true to an experienced criminal lawyer, or indeed anyone familiar with criminal law. In order to highlight them, we give a brief overview of the proceeding. The prosecution's case was uneventful. The defense first presented Lopez Estrada himself, the only defendant who took the stand. He testified about his Bay of Pigs history and subsequent meetings with high officials, his training in the Army, and his twenty-six commando raids against Cuba. But he also testified that his last payment from the CIA was in 1965, and his last raid was in 1963. He did testify that he had remained in contact with Grayston Lynch until the present time, and was still in contact with him. (Lynch, in fact, was present at court for the entire trial, and testified on behalf of the defendants.) Lopez Estrada also testified that he had received the map of the weapons cache in 1976 from a man he knew only as "Red Bob," whom he had known in 1961 as a member of the CIA, and whom he

¹⁰Ibid., p. 101.

assumed still was. He said that the weapons "were very dirty and in very bad situation because I think, if I recall correctly, that the weapons were hidden in 1966."¹¹ Finally, he mentioned in passing that he had been to the White House in 1976 to meet with an aide of President Ford.

What is important to remember is the following: except for the alleged meeting with "Red Bob" in 1976, Lopez Estrada testified to no substantive contacts with the CIA since 1965; he also testified that the weapons had been buried for 11 years, and were very dirty; and he mentioned, regarding 1976 simply that he had been to the White House. All of these points figured prominently in the subsequent crumbling of the government's case.

Grayston Lynch

The defense then called Grayston Lynch, CIA case officer for the Bay of Pigs invasion and Brigade 2506. Lynch testified about Lopez Estrada's training, particularly with respect to weapons, pointing out that the weapons provided to the Brigade by the CIA in the early 1960s were not registered so they could not be traced. He also testified that although some operations planned by the exiles received express approval, and some express disapproval, "there were some that we neither approved nor disapproved. . . [I]f they didn't bother anything they just ignored them."¹²

It was during Lynch's testimony that the first legal puzzler arose. The following colloquy occurred during the direct examination:

"Q. Could you indicate to the ladies and gentlemen of the jury how these weapons are acquired by the agency before distribution to the people that work under you for training purposes?

"A. I don't think, I do not think I could answer that.

"Q. Why would you be unable to answer that to the ladies and gentlemen of the jury?

"A. I think it is classified information.

"Q. Have you taken a certain oath as a member of the Central Intelligence Agency?

"A. Yes, I have.

"Q. All right. Does that oath preclude you from commenting on matters affecting national security?

"A. Unless it has been brought out before.

"Q. The question that I have just asked you is a matter that has been brought out before in which there is some type of public record on it.

"A. Yes, but I could not comment on it, neither to confirm nor deny it.

"Q. And you are restricted by your oath to the United States Government from doing so?

"A. That's right."¹³

O'Donnell, conducting the defense, had already labored Lynch's refusal to answer certain questions more than he should have. And in any other trial the exchange would have waved a red flag in front of the prosecutor. There is a well-known legal doctrine that if a witness pre-

sented by one side refuses to answer relevant questions put by the other side, that side can move to strike the *entire* testimony of the witness. A vigorous prosecutor, one would think, would have taken that advantage. Yet the cross-examination of Lynch was very brief, virtually insignificant, and touched on no sensitive areas. It would seem obvious that had the prosecutor gone to the heart of the matter of the CIA's dealings with Lopez Estrada and the others, and its providing them with weapons, he surely would have hit on a number of areas where Lynch would have refused to answer. And at that point he could have had his entire testimony stricken from the jury's consideration by the judge—something which has a substantial impact on a jury. But the government passed up the opportunity.

The defense called only one other witness, Bay of Pigs veteran and Brigade member Roberto Perez, who briefly reiterated the same experiences as Lopez Estrada, particularly the meetings with Bobby Kennedy and other high officials in the 1960s. Perez didn't know "Red Bob," but said he was always paid by "Grey Pete." Perez, much to the chagrin of the defense no doubt, also testified that he had not been involved in any raids since 1962, and didn't know anything about any other raids.

At this point the defense rested. The prosecution was now faced with a relatively simple credibility case which should have hinged on several points: First, were these weapons really given to Lopez Estrada by the CIA? If not, did Lopez Estrada and the others really believe they were? And even if they thought so, did that constitute a legal excuse?

At this point, the prosecution was entitled to bring on rebuttal witnesses, presumably to stress that the CIA had no involvement with the defendants, and had not planted these weapons for them or provided a map to them. And there was a further peculiarity here. Lopez Estrada showed the map to the court, and insisted there were still explosives on the island, and that he would lead anyone to it who wanted to see them. There is, however, no indication that any such cache really existed, nor any indication of any communication with the government of the Bahamas to check on this location, much less to warn them of live explosives lying in a hole on an island. There were a number of ways one might have proceeded to punch holes in the defendants' story. The prosecutor, however, called Robert Barteaux.

Robert Barteaux

If there was a sandbag thrown in this case, Barteaux was it. He took the stand as Edward Cohen, Assistant General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, joined the prosecution table. He identified himself as follows: "I am chief of the information processing group of the information services staff of the Director of Operations of Central Intelligence Agency."¹⁴ This was the first clinker. Knowledgeable journalists have indicated to *CovertAction* that Barteaux was in fact an operations case officer, that there was no such thing as the title he gave to the court, that it was made up for the occasion. (Whether this would constitute perjury is problematical.)

Barteaux stated, "My duties are to manage that part of the organization which conducts name traces and handles

¹¹*Ibid.*, Part II, p. 23.

¹²*Transcript*, January 9, 1978, Part I, p. 94.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 85.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, Part II, p. 29.

the records for the Bay of Pigs.

"Q. Upon request, sir, did you perform such a name tracing to one Armando Lopez Estrada?

"A. I did.

"Q. Did you come across his name?

"A. I did.

"Q. And, did you determine from your records whether there had been any contact between your agency and Mr. Lopez Estrada in 1976?

"A. In May of 1976 Mr. Estrada called the agency, Lopez Estrada, excuse me, called the agency on the public phone, a published number, and refused to give us any subject matter which he would like to discuss and that, after considerable effort, the call was terminated because we did not know what he wanted to talk about."¹⁵

Here was the second clinker. Why on earth did the prosecutor ask this question? All it did was establish that Lopez Estrada had in fact been in touch with the Agency as late as 1976, and open the door to embarrassing cross-examination by the defense. In fact, as the defense attorney correctly pointed out when he then succeeded in having Lopez Estrada recalled to counter this testimony, "It is not true rebuttal."¹⁶

Barteaux was then asked if he had conducted a name check for "Red Bob," and indicated that he had, and that there were no records of any such name. This, and this alone, would seem to be what he should have been called for, if he were a legitimate witness. But his cross-examination was mind-boggling. Consider O'Donnell's opening questions:

"Q. Sir, did you look for the name of Grayston Lynch in your records?

"A. Grayston Lynch?

"Q. Yes.

"A. I don't believe so, no.

"Q. Do you know him to have been a former CIA agent?

"A. No, I do not."¹⁷

Here we have the head records keeper for the CIA, who knows all about Lopez Estrada and, as we shall see, Pedro Gil, and he doesn't know who Grayston Lynch is, the same Grayston Lynch whom the entire world knows of as the CIA man in charge of the Bay of Pigs. Technically, however, employees of the CIA are case officers and members, and "agents" applies to non-employees engaged by case officers in various ways. It is likely that Barteaux was answering the question literally, deliberately misleading the court—a typical CIA practice.

In any event, Barteaux's concluding testimony on cross-examination was perhaps the most damaging single item for the prosecution in the entire trial. It follows:

"Q. Sir, as custodian for the Central Intelligence Agency, are you aware that Mr. Pedro Gil was in the employ of your agency until 1974?

"MR. SANFORD: Objection, Your Honor, beyond the scope of the direct.

Do you know whether he was?

"THE WITNESS: Yes, I do know.

"Q. He was, was he not? You paid him right up to 1974, did you not?

"MR. SANFORD: Objection, again going beyond—

"THE COURT: Let's say that he is. We are going to allow the question and the answer. You can answer the question.

"THE WITNESS: What was it?

"THE COURT: You paid him up until 1974?

"THE WITNESS: He received money through '74."¹⁸



Here is where the prosecution's case went down the drain. Pedro Gil never took the stand. Up until this point there was no testimony of contact between the defendants and the CIA since at the latest 1965, except for Lopez Estrada's poignant reunion with "Red Bob" fifteen years after the Bay of Pigs. Robert Barteaux, records keeper, just happens to know that Pedro Gil received payments until 1974. It is as if the CIA and the Justice Department dragged up, from the bowels of the building at Langley, the one person who would put into evidence just what the defense wanted to but couldn't. Contacts, actual payments by the CIA to one of the defendants continuing for thirteen years after the Bay of Pigs.

According to one observer at the trial, the CIA lawyer, Edward Cohen, ostentatiously tensed in his chair and glared at Barteaux when he testified about the payments. One would think that the Assistant General Counsel of the CIA would be more circumspect, unless, of course, he was playing to the jury.

¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 40.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 31.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.

The prosecutor's final weak argument was structured around the implausibility of Lopez Estrada's testimony, ridiculing the idea that instructions seventeen years before about different weapons and operations and from different people, could apply today. He made the argument; but it hardly had the same impact when the defense reminded the jury that Mr. Barteaux, the government's own witness, the CIA big shot, had told them that Pedro Gil continued in the pay of the CIA for so many, many years.²⁰

The Weapons

There is another oddity in this trial which involves the weapons. Lopez Estrada testified that they had been buried since 1966 and that they were very dirty. But Joe Crankshaw, the *Miami Herald* reporter who covered the trial, was in past years an infantry officer, and he looked at the weapons closely. It was hard to believe, he told *CovertAction*, that they could have been buried on a swampy Caribbean island for eleven years. The bores were clean and unrustled, with no pitting, and they were still covered with cosmoline, the packing grease used for new, unused weapons. Yet there was no testimony at the trial about the actual condition of the weapons, or their apparent ages. It seems that no one close to the case believes that there was a cache on that island, or that these weapons came from such a place.

An Analysis of the Trial

While the apparent decision not to press for a conviction in this case cannot be viewed in a vacuum, the trial in many ways speaks for itself. No one experienced in criminal law can read that transcript without wondering. The most important testimony for the defense arose either in cross-examination of defense witnesses by the prosecution, or came from the mouth of the key prosecution rebuttal witness. A shaky witness whose testimony could no doubt have been stricken was left unscathed.

The CIA, which could have sealed the prosecution's case, instead exploded it. Why was there never a prosecution witness called from the CIA to state, unequivocally, no, these men are not in the employ of the CIA; no, we have not given them weapons; and no, there was no "Red Bob" or anyone else authorized to present Armando Lopez Estrada with a map to a cache of weapons.

There are two glaring possibilities. Perhaps it is all true, and despite the government's protestations to the contrary, the CIA is still arming the Cuban exiles. Or, even if it is not true, perhaps Lopez Estrada and his colleagues know too much. Perhaps the CIA knew that if he were convicted, he might talk, and if he talked, who knows what might have

²⁰There is a complicated legal point here, which might be of interest to lawyers. It relates to the position taken throughout the trial by the defense that the defendants did not know they had to register the weapons. The judge, the defense attorneys and the prosecutor all agreed in the conference on instructions to the jury that, although knowledge was an element insofar as the possession must be knowing, and insofar as the items must be known to be firearms, the government did *not* have to prove that the defendants knew that firearms had to be registered. *Transcript*, January 9, 1978, Part II, pp. 53-54. Yet, when the instructions were actually given to the jury, they were led to believe, over and over, that an honest mistake might be an excuse. *Transcript*, January 10, 1978, pp. 14, 15, 16. According to one news account, this was a major factor in the jury's decision to acquit. *Miami News*, January 11, 1978.

come out? Then, of course, there is the whole political context.

Political Conclusions

In the final analysis, then, what is United States policy towards Cuba, and what is being condoned under the eyes of the government? The activities of the exiles have been known for years. Except for the breaks in the Letelier case, which are tentative at best, virtually nothing has been done. Whether the prosecutions in the assassination case will lead to more than a handful of convictions is doubtful. Brigade 2506 is alive and well. And, it seems, still being supplied.

It is possible, as they claim, that the CIA is not at present supplying much in the way of arms or money to the exiles, although one can never be sure. It was a shock to many when Robert Barteaux testified that payments were being made up through 1974. But, since 1973, there has been a new factor in the equation: Chile.

It is no secret, even before the Townley link became known, that the Chilean junta was amenable, even eager, to use Cuban exiles for its dirty work, and to pay them in weapons and funds for their troubles—weapons and funds that they could use against Cuba with Pinochet's blessings. From as early as 1974 it was clear that DINA was working with Cuban exiles, handing out assignments and transshipping weapons in payment.

One new development, in fact, has brought the Chilean menace even closer to home. Over the past few years, the incredibly repressive regime of Eric Gairy in Grenada has become Chile's one friend in the Caribbean, the only country that consistently votes with Chile in the OAS. And, more importantly, the only place in the Caribbean where Chilean naval vessels can, and do, dock with impunity. According to leading opponents of the Gairy regime, in the latter half of 1977 Chilean Navy ships began docking at St. George's, Grenada, and one such ship was observed, in the middle of the night, offloading huge numbers of crates. The crates were all marked "Medical Supplies," but they were all long, narrow crates, the kind weapons come in. They were taken away and hidden. Why medical supplies would be offloaded in the middle of the night is a good question. Why they would be hidden away and not appear in medical facilities is an even better one. There is a real danger that Chile is transshipping weapons to the Cuban exiles via Grenada, close to both Venezuela and the Dominican Republic, known exile centers.

The lessons to be drawn from trials such as these, and from all the current developments, are complex but powerful. For one thing, one can never underestimate the evil intentions of these forces. The much vaunted invasion of Cuba is a will-o'-the-wisp; the Cuban homeland seems secure. But the petty violence and the mindless bombing and killing by the exiles are serious threats to world peace unless and until the forces in a position to control and crush this terrorism do so. The investigations which are breaking—and those which have not yet done so—must be encouraged and pushed. North Americans, particularly, must demand an end to the unchecked excesses of the exile community in our midst, and the world at large must unite against Chilean fascism. Si, se puede.


—WS

“RESEARCHING CONSUMERS”: THE MARKET FOR DESTABILIZATION

In the fall of 1977, a select group of more than 450 residents of Kingston, Jamaica found on their doorsteps one morning some young people armed with a new kind of weapon in furtherance of the CIA/multinational-inspired war against democratic socialist Prime Minister Michael Manley. This time the weapon was not the guns and explosives which had become commonplace during the well-known destabilization attempts against Manley's left-leaning government, but a long, seemingly innocent questionnaire, which on closer inspection proved equally chilling in its implications for the future of the economically plagued and violence-torn island.

CovertAction Information Bulletin obtained a copy of the questionnaire, ambiguously entitled “Consumer Research Project: A Study of Three Communities in Kingston, Jamaica,” and with the assistance of a former CIA operations officer and an academic expert in social science and opinion research, we have examined the document in detail and come to the conclusion that a new overt ingredient has been added to the covert war against Jamaica. It is highly likely that this project was conceptualized and initiated as a method not only to recruit new CIA informers and agents on the island, but also to poll various strata of the island residents as to their willingness to accept or participate in a foreign-inspired or supported coup.

Jamaica, as we reported in the Winter 1976 issue of *CounterSpy*, had been subjected to a campaign of destabilization similar to that which toppled the Allende government in Chile, and this new method of operation may be but a continuation of that policy. What follows is our study of the questionnaire and some attempt to analyze its real meaning.



The Recipients

A “Dear Respondent” letter attached at the beginning of the questionnaire thanks the recipients for their “willing participation” in answering questions which are “the results of years of research and much effort which has gone into their preparation.” The more than 450 subjects of the research are assured in the letter: “In any event, your response will be completely anonymous. Every effort has

been made in designing the questionnaire to ensure that you can never be identified from your response.”

Without any doubt, this statement is an outright lie. Not only were the respondents, as the letter admits, “specially chosen,” but also each person answering the questionnaire was given a “Questionnaire Number” by the interviewer to write in the blank which was provided. This can only mean that there exists a master list of respondents, and this number enables the answers to be recorded, correlated and analyzed with respect to their names and addresses. Even if each person's name and answers were not to be printed in one of Kingston's daily papers, the guarantee of anonymity is patently false. We shall discuss the implications of this later.

Additionally, the “Dear Respondent” letter indicates that those who prepared the questions were well attuned to the formidable political development and awareness of Jamaican citizens today. Anticipating this, the letter emphasizes rather defensively: “The project is in no way connected with any government agency, neither will the results be made available to such an agency or organization. The results will be used for educational purposes only and will better explain how people like you feel about many products you buy and many of the social and economic problems that all Jamaicans face. What you will tell us may help lead to changes in these areas that will benefit people across this wonderful land of ours.”

It is implicit in the above statements that the government referred to as having no involvement in the questionnaire is the Jamaican government. This is undoubtedly true. But the letter does not even hint, nor would many of the respondents be aware, that in fact governments of other

countries—the U.S. government, the CIA, and the multinational corporations they protect—have a great deal of interest in the answers to the carefully prepared questions.

Who Is Behind The Questionnaire?

The project is ostensibly being directed by Lee Roy Duffus, a 39-year-old Jamaican-born graduate of New York's Pratt Institute, where he received a B.S. in Mechanical En-

gineering, and Purdue University, where he received an M.S. in Industrial Administration. In 1971 Duffus began a Ph.D. program in Operations Management, but after he completed his coursework he returned to Jamaica to work with Exxon Oil Company as chemicals manager at their Kingston refinery. Duffus cancelled his *in absentia* academic status in January 1973 to continue with Exxon at least through 1975, and probably until mid-1977. After setting up the questionnaire and supervising the initial interviewing of respondents, he went to Nassau, Bahamas, for a few weeks as a "consultant" in an undivulged field of work. He then returned to Kingston for a short time to check the progress of the project, and then on to Purdue, where, in early 1978, he re-registered in the Ph.D. program. Duffus went back once more to Kingston in late January for about two weeks, apparently to pick up the completed questionnaires.



Taking into account both Duffus' academic training and the technical nature of his employment with Exxon, it is unlikely that this man was really in charge of such a large-scale, politically sensitive project on his own. Clearly, a research project of this magnitude, involving the design and printing of the questionnaire, design of the computer program, hiring and coordinating employees to conduct the over 450 interviews, the required computer time, and the correlation and analysis of the data, could not have been paid for out of Mr. Duffus' pocket. Yet, when reached by a *New York Times* reporter, one of Duffus' academic advisors said that indeed Duffus was conducting such a study as part of his Ph.D. thesis program, and that he was paying for it entirely out of his own pocket.

The Questionnaire

The questionnaire contains 133 separate questions, many of which include sub-parts, totalling 415 items requiring answers. No small wonder the letter apologizes that "unfortunately, all questions must be answered. . . completely and honestly," reinforced further by a "please answer all questions" printed at the top of each page.

The scope of the statements and questions contain such a high degree of political content that even a layman understands this is not the kind of "consumer research" Ralph Nader, for example, might undertake. Part I contains 48 questions with a 9-point scale from "Strongly agree" to "strongly disagree." The gist of the questions, most of which are suggestively phrased, is to place the respondent on a scale measuring Jamaican nationalism versus acceptance or positive feelings about foreign political domination and foreign imperialism. The respondent's attitudes are assessed in the following areas:

(a) Inclination to emigrate (especially to the U.S.) versus being firmly rooted in Jamaica.

(b) Inclination to accept foreign aid and economic guidance versus real Jamaican political and economic independence.

(c) Inclination to accept foreign corporate investment, profits, and imports, as well as foreign products as preferable or superior to Jamaican products versus negative feelings toward foreign imperialism.

Following are some of the questions and an effort to analyze them:

5. In the interest of fairness to all, it would be better to use foreign soldiers for police in this country in the event of internal disorder instead of Jamaican soldiers or police.
17. An international police force ought to be the only group in the world allowed to have weapons.
20. I don't see why it's so important that this country should be free to determine which system of government it wants.
40. It is ridiculous to say that no other nation has a right to tell Jamaica how to manage its own affairs.

The strength of feeling in the answers given to these show how receptive the respondent would be in the event of direct political, economic, or military intervention in Jamaican affairs.

3. It is silly to love one's country more than any other just because you were born there.
14. I don't feel patriotic because I see too many flaws in my country.
16. I don't care which country I live in as long as I am happy.
18. Our country is probably no better than any other.
22. I don't know much about other countries, but I am not satisfied with this one.
24. One should strive for loyalty to mankind before considering loyalty to any particular country.
30. I don't feel any special pride in being identified with Jamaica.
31. The high cost of living and other hardships far exceed the benefits which Jamaica derives from being an independent country.
42. It is unreasonable to ask Jamaicans to accept economic hardships just to ensure that the country remains independent.
43. Jamaicans should be willing to accept any sacrifice that ensures that the country remains independent.

These statements are made to assess whether the "consumer" (respondent) is nationalistic, loyal, proud of their heritage and identity, or on the other hand, how anti-Jamaica and anti-government they might be. It would be difficult for the respondent to feel neutral toward these statements, so they are effective in deriving the kind of

PLEASE ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS**Statement****Strongly Agree****Strongly Disagree**

11. Jamaica should have greater consultation with more experienced nations in developing its Laws. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ()

12. Jamaica was better-off before Independence. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ()

13. Immigration should be controlled by an international organization rather than by each country on its own. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ()

14. I don't feel patriotic because I see too many flaws in my country. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ()

15. All prices for exported or imported products should be set by an international trade committee. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ()

16. I don't care which country I live in as long as I am happy. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ()

17. An international police force ought to be the only group in the world allowed to have weapons. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ()

18. Our country is probably no better than any other. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ()

19. Everyone who loves his country has a duty to serve it by cooperating with his fellow citizen in building the country for the benefit of all. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ()

20. I don't see why it's so important that this country should be free to determine which system of government it wants. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ()

21. I would prefer to be a citizen of the world rather than of any particular country. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ()

22. I don't know much about other countries, but I am not satisfied with this one. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ()

23. I would prefer to be an American rather than a Jamaican citizen. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ()

information that obviously is being sought about his or her attitudes.

7. Jamaica should have greater consultation with more experienced nations in developing its foreign policies.
8. The easiest route to economic development is by imitating more developed countries.
11. Jamaica should have greater consultation with more experienced nations in developing its laws.
25. An international committee on education should have full control over what is taught in all countries about history and politics.

These statements probe the respondents' views about independence and national sovereignty as compared to the virtues of outside direction in developing the laws, domestic and foreign political-economic policies of the country, and the virtue of imitating other countries' systems. Depending on the rest of the answers given, this latter group could then be interpreted as demonstrating a propensity either toward free-enterprise capitalism or in favor of socialism.

23. I would prefer to be an American rather than a Jamaican citizen.
28. If I could obtain a permanent visa to go to the United States I would leave Jamaica as soon as possible.

Answers to these two statements clearly will help the project evaluators to determine the person's readiness to leave Jamaica forever. Because the U.S. is specified in statement 28, this is a surreptitious way of drawing out political sympathies vis-a-vis the United States.

12. Jamaica was better-off before Independence.
32. Jamaica was better off before independence from England.

These two statements take a reading of the respondent's views about Jamaica's colonial relationship with the United Kingdom. As with statement 28, this isolates the U.K., apparently with a similar intent in mind.

33. Any foreigner who sees an opportunity to invest his money here and does so should be free to do whatever he likes with his profit, so long as he obeys the Laws of Jamaica.
35. Since foreign companies invest a lot of money in Jamaica it is only fair that they be allowed to take their profit out of the country.
37. Non Jamaicans should be allowed to own land in Jamaica if they desire to do so.
39. It is not important if any business is local or foreign owned, since they both serve the country.
41. The need to develop local industry is not a strong enough reason to deprive people of the variety of products available through import.

Once again, the power of suggestion is employed. These statements are designed for one purpose: to provide a gauge of the respondent's acceptance and positive liking of or opposition to active involvement in the Jamaican economy by foreign investors, both by individuals and multinational

corporations. Statement 41 is especially interesting because it is difficult to answer either way and not be caught in the middle.

1. Jamaican Art should be preserved at all costs.
4. I would never trade my Jamaican citizenship for that of any other country.
19. Everyone who loves his country has a duty to serve it by cooperating with his fellow citizen in building the country for the benefit of all.
26. No duty is more important than duty to one's own country.
38. Loyalty to one's moral convictions is more important than loyalty to one's country.
48. If all Jamaicans are self reliant then the entire nation will be self reliant.

Of the 48 statements in this part of the questionnaire, these are practically the only ones which can be categorized as being phrased in a positive tone. Yet, each of them has a built-in yardstick of the person's attitude toward Jamaica. Note that the first statement is as mild and non-controversial as possible, but it is designed to get the respondent warmed up to the heavy statements which follow.

34. Censorship can never be justified in a free country.

As with a number of other statements in the questionnaire, this one is deeper than it seems. The respondent's sense of idealism is being tested against his or her willingness to accept or promote an authoritarian approach. The answer can in turn be correlated with the attitudes expressed about the system of government in Jamaica today.

27. If I can help it I would not fight for any country.

This statement is not presented solely to discover whether the respondent is a pacifist, or even a coward. It could be expected to provide a small number of respondents who might take up arms in military or paramilitary activity (on behalf of a country other than Jamaica) if the opportunity arose, and who if acceptable on other levels, might therefore be recruitable.

6. I am not happy with everything I see in Jamaica and because of this I would consider leaving this country to live in another that is more suitable.
10. Regardless of the benefits to the country, I am unwilling to work in any capacity that is not in my best interest.
29. I would like to go from country to country and settle down where I am happiest.

These statements seek to evaluate the degree to which the respondent is interested in personal gain and comfort. As in the previous case, they can also be applied to gauge the person's recruitability as a kind of mercenary (in a military or other capacity).

36. In general, imported products are superior to locally produced products.
44. There should be a greater variety of brands in the products available at the supermarket.

45. It is not necessary to sell more than one brand of any product in a small country such as ours.

46. In general price is more important to me than which country a product was made in.

47. It is better to buy Jamaican made products whenever they are available than to buy imported products.

These statements begin to look at the respondent's orientation towards imported consumer goods or, put more bluntly, their predisposition to be bribed by the availability of such goods. The person's attitudes in this area are also assessed in the latter parts of the questionnaire.

Class Analysis

Part II of the questionnaire draws from the "anonymous" respondent a wide range of hard data which can be used to establish quite precisely their economic and social class position in Jamaican society. Not only the normal questions like age, marital status, number and ages of children, type of dwelling lived in, educational level attained, and occupation are asked. It demands to know first the combined weekly income of the respondent and his or her spouse, and then three questions later, as if to cross-check against the first answer, the respondent's annual income.

Question 26 asks, "In general, would you say that you belong to the: 1) Lower lower class; 2) Lower class; 3) Middle class; 4) Upper middle class; 5) Upper class." This is not just an idle question. It leaves us more than an inference as to what is the fundamental underlying dynamic of this self-proclaimed "consumer research project"—to force "willing" and "anonymous" respondents to reveal what are, in anybody's book, intimate details about their lives and feelings.

The respondents are asked about their reading habits, which newspapers and other publications they read, and which parts of the newspapers they read (*i.e.*, political news, other local news, comics, international news, sports, editorials, birth/death notices, society, horoscope, etc.), measured on a scale from "extremely interested" to "not interested." The respondent is asked to apply this same scale and another "extremely informed" to "uninformed" scale to their awareness of local and international political and economic events.

Fifteen countries are listed (U.S., Ethiopia, Japan, China, France, United Kingdom, Guyana, Soviet Union, Mexico, Germany, Trinidad, Nigeria, Egypt, Brazil, and Cuba), and the respondents are asked how many times (if any) they have visited each. Then: "Given a choice of a two week, all expense paid trip to any of the above listed countries, which would you prefer to visit? Why?" Another esoteric question that yields the researcher considerable insight into the respondent's political-cultural orientation and sophistication.

Part III is the only part of the questionnaire that deals with what traditionally might be called "consumer research" (products, prices, quality, etc.). It is designed to measure feelings about Jamaican vs. other products. It seeks out the respondent's preferences (on a "Satisfactory"—"Unsatisfactory" scale) of eight different consumer items (spray deodorant, vitamins, mirrors, jewelry, toothpaste, canned



foods, ladies clothing, and portable electric fans) in terms of five countries of manufacture (Jamaica, the U.S., United Kingdom, Trinidad, and Japan). This particular section also measures the person's honesty and consistency, first with regard to Jamaican products (by asking the same questions twice about products produced there), and then by making the respondent answer the same question all over again for all the products and all the countries, but this time slightly re-phrased with a ranked 1 to 5 scale of "how favorable/unfavorable they (the same five countries) appeal to you as a source" of the products.

The final section of the questionnaire seeks the same kind of information about the respondent's partiality toward the U.S., United Kingdom, Japan, and Trinidad, as compared to Jamaica. This time however, the range of variables is made considerably wider than just the consumer products of the respective countries. The intent of these queries is to probe the attitudes and affinities felt by the respondent toward rival imperialisms. Take the following for example:

Compared to Jamaica, would you say that in (the four countries)—

- (1) The Government is more/less/equally effective;
- (2) Workers are more/less/equally reliable;
- (3) People are more/less/equally self reliant;
- (4) Life is not as hard/harder/just as hard;
- (5) People are more/less/equally intelligent;
- (6) The educational level is higher/lower/about the same;
- (7) People do not have to work as hard/work harder/work just as hard;
- (8) Life is more/less/just as relaxed;
- (9) People are more/less/about as trustworthy;
- (10) People are more/less/just as interested in helping each other.

The Big Question: Why?

To try to understand why a 39-year-old Jamaican who worked until recently as a technician with one of America's largest conglomerates was conducting an irrefutably political "consumer research project" far afield from his own background or work in the fall of 1977 in Kingston, Jamaica, we must give some brief indicators of the political climate previous to and during the period of the project.

In the pre-independence Jamaica, the two major political parties, Alexander Bustamante's Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) and Norman Washington Manley's Progressive National Party (PNP), were much the same. Both were tied in with the leading labor unions on the island, and advocated nationalism and independence within the Commonwealth. After independence in 1962, the JLP government proceeded to maintain good relations with both Britain, with whom it was tightly allied economically, and the United States, whose tourists were a major source of income, and whose aluminum companies, since World War II, had been essential to the local economy. In 1972, when the government switched to the PNP, and Norman Manley's son Michael, also a union leader, became Prime Minister, little changes were foreseen.

However, two years after entering office, Manley shocked the conservative elements in the country by announcing the new program of the PNP—"Democratic Socialism." From 1974, Manley has attempted to chart a moderately socialist course, nationalizing portions of the aluminum industry, banks, sugar cane plantations, and the like. Early on he made what in the eyes of the U.S. government, and especially the CIA, was the cardinal sin. He became friendly with Fidel Castro. Manley has visited Cuba, and Fidel has visited Jamaica. There have been exchanges of technicians, educators, agronomists, doctors, etc.

By 1976 it was clear that neither U.S. nor British intelligence were happy with developments, and during that year a massive destabilization campaign was waged. Guns, thugs, explosives and poisons were imported, and violence became widespread. By June of 1976, Manley had to declare a State of Emergency, and forbid completely the possession of weapons. Within a short time the violence had abated, although the damage done to the tourist industry has still not been completely reversed. Destabilization in such a blatant form had not worked. The example of Chile was too fresh in the minds of the people, and some of the ham-handed attempts at toppling the Manley government were almost carbon copies of some of the tricks pulled in Chile.



In September 1976, Philip Agee went to Jamaica at the invitation of the Jamaica Council for Human Rights, a legal, civil rights organization. While there, Agee investigated and exposed the intensive, CIA-backed destabilization campaign, and publicly named nine CIA officers then operating in

Jamaica under diplomatic cover, including the then Chief of Station, Norman M. Descoteaux. Shortly after returning to Britain, where he and his family had lived since 1972, Agee was served with a deportation order. After a protracted eight-month struggle which affected a broad cross-section of British public opinion, he was finally deported in June 1977. Coincidentally, at this same moment, the "Consumer Research Project" was being readied.


It is clear that around this time in Jamaica, as the State of Emergency was lifted, a new approach was underway: extensive economic destabilization. Foreign loans became more and more difficult; the importation of foreign products became harder; credit was cut off. And the International Monetary Fund made it known that it was willing to consider loans to Jamaica only if certain preconditions were filled. Meanwhile, the right-wing, which controlled the JLP, and maintained a powerful minority in the PNP, began to increase its attacks on the Manley government. The local press, which was controlled entirely by the conservative, wealthy few families which dominated the local economy, became nearly rabid in their condemnation of democratic socialism.

The situation in Jamaica is still very fluid. Manley has been forced to accept certain IMF loans to maintain international credit. The requirements laid down by the IMF remain in large part secret. The forces on the island have become more and more polarized, and pressures on the government mount. The right has made it clear that it would not be averse to drastic action—whether an internal or an external *coup*—and Manley will not be able to appease both wings of his party at the same time much longer.

In the midst of this delicate situation, the significance of this "consumer research" becomes clear.

While it is not possible to determine the personal motives of Lee Roy Duffus (aside perhaps from getting a Ph.D.), it is clear that this project could not be solely his own. Consider the number of questions. Presuming that all of the 450-plus respondents followed instructions and answered each and every one of the 415 questions/statements in the questionnaire (which must have taken them an average of two hours each—quite a chunk of interviewing time for a simple "consumer research project"), there would be a total of more than 188,750 responses on the completed forms. For obvious statistical and analytical reasons (and as Duffus confirms in his "Dear Respondent" letter), a study with this volume of raw data to be tabulated, correlated and analyzed would require a sophisticated computer program and sufficient computer time.

If the questions "are the results of years of research," had Duffus been working on these questions while on the job, or during his lunch breaks, as Exxon's chemicals manager since 1971? Moreover, a person like Duffus would hardly have either the means or the training and background to analyze properly the data, much less to apply it to what Duffus calls "the social and economic problems that all Jamaicans face." Such a program requires organization. Since Purdue University has no known program of any kind in Jamaica or related to Jamaica at its West Lafayette, Indiana campus, and since the Jamaican government knew nothing about this project until informed about it from a number of the "specially chosen" respondents, we must consider carefully whether an outside organization might be behind the whole operation.



When a *New York Times* reporter spoke to Duffus about the project, and asked him about the contents of his questionnaire, his funding, the degree of the Jamaican government's knowledge and sanction of the project, etc., Duffus seemed strangely naive and defensive. He refused any comment on the source of funding or the relationship, if any, of Exxon to the overall effort. He promised to call the reporter back, but never did.

Conclusion

In exposing this covert Caribbean project, we are cognizant of three important factors.

1. Duffus may or may not actually have been conscious of the political implications of such a project, although as both a Ph.D. candidate and a citizen of contemporary Jamaica, such ignorance would seem inconceivable.

2. Exxon may or may not have been involved directly, since it has not been established conclusively that Duffus was an Exxon employee during the period the project was being formulated and implemented. He was, however, definitely employed by them in the recent past.

3. Exxon may or may not have been fronting for the CIA if it was employing Duffus at the time. It is patently obvious that the project is not a simple toothpaste consumer survey, and that the project must involve a major financial input. It is also curious that a Purdue University spokesperson said Duffus was funding the project "entirely on his own."

Given the 450-plus sample, it seems likely that there would emerge about 25 to 50 people that fit into the CIA's desired mold, and who therefore would likely be recruitable to do the CIA's bidding in whatever way is best suited to their abilities, whether in Jamaica or elsewhere. In addition to deriving a number of recruits there are strong indications in the questionnaire of another, even more sinister objective.

Statements 5, 17, 20 and 40 suggest that Lee Roy Duffus and friends were really asking what the respondent's stance is toward a (hypothetical) foreign military intervention or a (hypothetical) *coup d'état*, directed at Jamaica. Statement 27 and to some extent statements 6, 10 and 29 are looking for prospective first-line participants in such interventions in Jamaica's internal affairs.

What better research could an intelligence agency possibly want than the results of this research on Jamaica's "consumers"?

The history of the CIA is replete with covert operations of various sizes and shapes run under corporate cover. The offer of \$1 million to the CIA by ITT for direct application against the presidential campaign of Salvador Allende, and its subsequent participation with assistance from the CIA and other companies in spending some \$700,000 in the 3-year destabilization program is the most famous example. There are also numerous other cases where private companies have been active participants in CIA operations, some of them initiated and entirely funded by the CIA, which are known as "proprietary."

The list is lengthy, but includes Fodor Travel Publications, J. Walter Thompson Company, Robert Mullen Company, and as former State Department intelligence man John Marks points out, Southern Capital and Management Corporation, Southern Air Transport, Air America, Africair, Pan African Airlines, United Business Associates, Joseph Z. Taylor & Associates, and many more, including those yet to be discovered.

Other companies, legitimate in their own right, have provided cover to CIA personnel in various parts of the U.S. and around the world. Some justify their actions by reasons of patriotism, but most collaborate because it helps their business. For example, Howard Hughes' former lieutenant, Robert Maheu, testified that Hughes believed that "if he ever became involved in any problem with the government, it would be beneficial for him to be in a position of being a front."

Obviously the CIA is just as interested in maintaining its present cover arrangements and in forging new ones as Howard Hughes was in fronting for them to serve his own ends. A five-year plan of the CIA is strong evidence of the Agency's fear of the vulnerabilities of its traditional cover arrangements with the Department of State. *Newsweek* quotes the document: "We are dealing with our cover impediments by creating a truly clandestine corps of operations officers."

With numerous similar "social science" surveys, many created in the 1960s and 1970s by the Rand Corporation in Southeast Asia and Latin America, as a precedent, the so-called "consumer research project" of Lee Roy Duffus could well be a signal of one small part of the changing mode of operations undertaken by the CIA.

-LW



RECENT NEWS

Whistleblowers' Conference

On the weekend of May 19-20, 1978, a *Whistleblowers' Conference* was held in Washington, DC, under the auspices of the Institute for Policy Studies. The lengthy conference included talks by legislators, news reporters, and a number of well-known whistleblowers. Among them were Daniel Ellsberg of Pentagon Papers fame; John Stockwell, Donald Jordan, and Frank Snepp, all formerly of the CIA; journalists Daniel Schorr and Gloria Emerson; and Senator James Abourezk. Participants from IPS included Saul Landau, Robert Borosage, Marc Raskin, and Ralph Stavins, the Director of the Government Accountability Project of IPS, the organizer of the conference.

Plans for the publication of the proceedings of the conference are underway, and persons interested in receiving a copy should drop a line to Ralph Stavins, Institute for Policy Studies, 1901 Q Street, NW, Washington, DC 20009.

Harvey Point CIA Base Exposed

A feature story in the June 25, 1978 *Virginian-Pilot and Ledger-Star*, a Norfolk, Virginia newspaper, has exposed the Defense Department Ordnance Testing Base at Harvey Point, North Carolina, for what it really is: "a secret Central Intelligence Agency paramilitary training base." According to the article, which was picked up by newspapers throughout the United States, "the base was activated in 1960 as an equipment staging area for the ill-fated CIA-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961. Since then, the CIA has trained its officers, mercenaries, and foreign troops there for operations in the Belgian Congo, Cuba, and parts of Latin America and Southeast Asia." This base appears to augment the better-known facilities at Camp Peary, Virginia, where the CIA has conducted espionage training for many years.

The base, and the air space over it, are off limits to everyone, but local residents tell strange tales of hearing explosions and seeing flashes of light, and seeing small planes entering and leaving. But most chilling of all are the stories about the cars. Every few days, Navy trucks



bring batches of new passenger cars onto the base, and every few days demolished cars are brought out. Some, according to neighbors, have their hoods blown off; others are smashed flat. It seems clear that the CIA is still training terrorists in passenger car demolition—just like the training which Michael V. Townley received and later put to use in the assassination of Orlando Letelier and Ronnie Moffitt. This is not training to defend this or any other country. This is training in brutal murder, no more, no less, and it would be interesting to know by what theory the Defense Department justifies such activity.

EXCHANGE SUBSCRIPTIONS WANTED

The *CovertAction Information Bulletin* is anxious to enter into exchange subscriptions with all other progressive publications. If you will drop us a note indicating that you have entered a subscription for us, we will immediately enter one for you. If you have a publication you believe would be worth our describing in our Publications of Interest section, please send us appropriate details.

NAMING NAMES

A regular feature of the *CovertAction Information Bulletin*.

We do not believe that one can separate the dirty work of the CIA from the people who perform it. The exposure of past operations is valuable, but it is only half the job. How many times have we all heard the CIA, the FBI and others say, whenever a particularly nasty covert operation has been exposed, "Oh yes, but we don't do that any more." We believe that they do, and that the same people are often involved.

As a service to our readers, and to progressive people around the world, we will continue to expose high-ranking CIA officials whenever and wherever we find them. This column, we hope, will usually be longer. In preparing the premier issue, we have been unable to conduct much of our regular research, and have one item for our readers:

The new CIA Chief of Station in JAMAICA is *Dean J. Almy, Jr.* Almy replaces Norman Descoteaux, who was exposed by Philip Agee in late 1976, during the Manley reelection campaign. Almy was born December 18, 1926, in New Jersey. From 1951 to 1955 he was a "political analyst" for the Department of the Army—a dead giveaway for early CIA activity. From 1956 to 1958 he was a political officer at the Medan, Indonesia consulate; from 1960 to 1962 he was a political officer at the Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia embassy; from 1962 to 1965 he was a political officer at the Manila, Philippines embassy; and from 1973 till recently he was a political liaison officer at the Madrid,



Spain embassy. During his tenure in Spain, his CIA connections were exposed in the Madrid magazine, *Cambio 16*.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

CovertAction Information Bulletin will appear approximately five to seven times per year. Subscriptions are for six consecutive issues. All payments must be by check or money order in U.S. funds, payable to Covert Action Publications.

- \$10.00 (USA)
- \$15.00 (Canada, Mexico, Caribbean and Central America—AIR)
- \$16.00 (S. America, Europe and Mediterranean Africa—AIR)
- \$18.00 (Asia, Pacific, rest of Africa—AIR)

Name and Address:

Mail to: *CovertAction*, P.O. Box 50272, F St. Station, Washington, DC 20004.

PUBLICATIONS OF INTEREST

Some Interesting New Publications

Howard M. Wachtel, *The New Gnomes: Multinational Banks in the Third World*, 60 pp., \$3.00, plus \$.25 postage, from Transnational Institute, 1901 Q Street, NW, Washington, DC 20009; or 20 Paulus Potterstraat, Amsterdam 1007, Holland.

Michael T. Klare, *Supplying Repression*, 56 pp., \$2.50, from The Field Foundation, 100 E. 85th St., New York, NY 10028. (A detailed look at U.S. military and private aid to human rights violators around the world.)

Some Worthwhile Periodicals

First Principles, the newsletter of the Center for National Security Studies, 10 issues/year, \$15 (\$10/students) from CNSS, 122 Maryland Avenue, NE, Washington, DC 20002. (An excellent review of the abuses of the U.S. intelligence community, with a comprehensive bibliography in each issue.)

NACLA Report on the Americas, bi-monthly journal of the North American Congress on Latin America, \$11/year

(for air, add: U.S. & Canada, \$4; Mexico, C. Am., Carib., \$6; S. Am., Eur., \$8; rest, \$9), from NACLA, P.O. Box 57, Cathedral Station, New York, NY 10025. (Well-researched reports on the political economy of the Americas, with particular attention to the role of U.S. imperialism.)

Organizing Notes, the newsletter of the Campaign to Stop Government Spying, available by request to the Campaign, 201 Massachusetts Avenue, NE, Room 112, Washington, DC 20002. (It is suggested that foreign requests include a contribution to cover airmail postage.) (A review of activities in the U.S. involving the surveillance practices of the CIA, FBI, and other intelligence agencies.)

State Research, from the United Kingdom, newsletter of a group of independent security apparatus researchers, £3/year, U.K. and Europe; \$8, elsewhere, individuals; \$16, institutions, from State Research, 9 Poland Street, London, W1, United Kingdom. (Research notes from a group of counterspies in the U.K., with much information, especially about British intelligence, hard to come by elsewhere.)

CovertAction Information Bulletin

Covert Action Publications, Inc.
P.O. Box 50272
F Street Station
Washington, DC 20004